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THE NEPA MODEL FOR THE PROTECTION
OF COASTAL AESTHETICS:
THE VIEW FROM THE COURTS*
INTRODUCTION
T he Coastal Zone Management Act of 19721 raises anew the diffi-
culties aesthetic values present for the legal system. It acknowl-
edges the coastal zone as an aesthetic resource2 and authorizes the
coastal states3 to develop plans for the preservation, protection and
enhancement of the aesthetic quality of the zone.4 As of 1978, all
thirty eligible states and four of five United States territories were
participating in the program. They must identify areas deserving
protection and develop institutional structures to effect the objec-
tives of the Act.
Although dispute is likely to arise over any effort to identify
or evaluate environmental beauty, various legislatures, govern-
mental agencies and courts offer protection to this amenity. Unless
these institutions can meet the challenges aesthetic values pose,
however, attempted protection will be excessively expensive and
ineffective. Unless questions of aesthetic value can be decided, the
legal system's protection of aesthetics will be necessarily arbitrary.
Society's reliance upon the police power for the protection of
aesthetic values has been upheld by many courts, including the
Supreme Court of the United States.6 Other forms of governmental
* The research for this article was undertaken as part of the Sea Grant Law Program
of the Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo, spon-
sored by the New York Sea Grant Institute under a grant from the Office of Sea Grant,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Com-
merce. The U.S. Government and the New York Sea Grant Institute are authorized to
produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright
notation appearing hereon.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976).
2. Id. § 1451(b), (e).
3. For purposes of the Act, "coastal state" means a state of the United States in, or
bordering on, the Atlantic, Padfic, or Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island
Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes. For the purposes of this chapter, the term
also includes Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Somoa. Id. § 1453(c).
4. Id. § 1452.
5. 9 COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUAL=TY ANN. R p. 249 (1978).
6. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal. 3d 762, 592 P.2d 728, 154
Cal. Rptr. 212 (1979); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967);
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protection include provisions for case by case review of develop-
mental plans by legislatively directed agencies, acquisition of prop-
erty interests, use of tax incentives and encouragement of private
action through public education.7 Now that there have been insti-
tutional decisions to protect coastal aesthetics, it must be deter-
mined which of these methods will best protect aesthetic values
and whether aesthetic issues can indeed be resolved.
Although some proposals for resolving aesthetic questions are
misguided,8 our notion of aesthetic value permits their resolution.
Any successful effort to protect environmental aesthetics must
accept the demands of the underlying notion. Not every structure
devised to protect aesthetics will be effective in meeting the chal-
lenge. One device-legislative direction to governmental agencies
as embodied in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)9-was extolled as especially appropriate shortly after it
was enacted,10 but it does not appear to have lived up to its promise.
The history of the implementation of NEPA, as reflected in the
decisions of reviewing courts, suggests that NEPA has done little
to ensure the protection of aesthetic values." Apparently this
Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963). For law review considera-
tions, see Comment, Aesthetic Zoning: The Creation of a New Standard, 48 J. URn. L. 740
(1971); Note, Architectural Control Justified on the Basis of Property Value Protection,
1971 WASH. U. L. Q. 118.
7. Roy MANN Assoc., AESrHmIC RESOuRCEs OF THE COASTAL ZONE, (NAT'L OcEANIC &
ATMOsPHERIC AD., OFFCE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT) 83-85 (July 1975). See also
Leighty, Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmental Control, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1847
(1971).
8. See note 13 infra.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4861 (1976).
10. In 1972, Professor Broughton declared that administrative processes held greatest
prospect for the protection of aesthetics:
Of the three methods for working aesthetic values into the law-common law
nuisance, the use of police powers, and legislative requirements placed upon the
administrative process-it would seem that the latter provides the best means for
success and that the use of common law nuisance presents the most remote chance
for success.
Broughton, Aesthetics and Environmental Law: Decisions and Values, 7 LAND & WATER
L. REv. 451, 500 (1972). His evaluation was based upon a supposed tendency of the courts
to follow rather than to lead value consensus, and a supposed ability of the agencies to
act deliberately because of their adequate time and staff resources. The record subsequently
compiled suggests that implementation of any such ability is predicated upon definite
agency assignments and close court review.
11. It has been said that because NEPA imposes a "secondary mandate" which often
conflicts with the impetus of the agency's primary mandates, the courts play a particularly
significant role in enforcing its demands. See, e.g., Wichelman, Administrative Agency Im-
plementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework
for Explaining Differential Response, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263 (1976). See also notes
49-54 & accompanying text infra. The significance of court review makes analysis of
decisions especially meaningful in judging the implementation of NEPA.
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results from the peculiar characteristics of aesthetic values, the
vagueness of the congressional directives, and the fact that these
directives were given to all agencies without regard to their exper-
tise in aesthetic matters. The following pages characterize the
notion of aesthetics and set out the basis for this evaluation of
NEPA. The findings of this study suggest that the states currently
implementing the Coastal Zone Management Act would do well
to focus their attention upon other devices, particularly upon the
use of the police power.
I. AESTHETIC VALUES
Matters of public health such as air pollution can often be
quantified. Presented in such a form, dangerous situations are
difficult to ignore, and the effectiveness of programs is easy to
measure. But aesthetic matters do not lend themselves to similar
quantification. Even though NEPA encouraged the development
of devices that would allow for the quantification of aesthetic
values, 12 completely satisfactory devices are not yet available.' 8
Certain conceptual observations can be made about aesthetic
discourse to distinguish it from discourse concerning mere matters
of taste.'4 Aesthetics can then be placed into a context in which
its peculiar characteristics are more familiar. From such a vantage
point it is possible to characterize the sorts of steps that must be
taken to protect aesthetics.
Disputes over aesthetics among observers of the same objects
are, of course, quite likely. The mere possibility of such dispute,
however, distinguishes aesthetic discourse from discourse involving
matters of taste. Aesthetic judgments make a claim to universality.' 5
An individual who expresses such a judgment claims that an object
is beautiful or harmonious, for example, to anyone who properly
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (B) (1976).
13. For surveys of presently available devices, see M. BAGLEY, C. KROLL & K. CLARK,
AEsTHETcs IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING (Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Re-
search and Dev.) (1973); R. Viom., JR., LANDSCAPE EVALUATION: A REvIEW OF CURRENT
TECHNIQUES AND METHODOLOGIES, (SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry,
Syracuse, N.Y.) (1975). See also Lapping, Environmental Impact Assessment Methodologies:
A Critique, 4 ENv'rL AFFAIRS 123 (1975).
14. Contra, Wildavsky, Aesthetic Power or the Triumph of the Sensitive Minority
Over the Vulgar Mass: A Political Analysis of the New Economics, 96 DAEDALUS 1115
(1967). For Wildavsky, aesthetics is a matter of politics, not of facts. For an example of
the sort of analysis to which Wildavsky objects, see Sullivan & Arias, Concepts and Princi-
ples for Environmental Economics, 2 ENVT'L AFFAIRS 597 (1972).
15. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT §§ 6-8 (J. Bernard trans. 1951).
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perceives it.l6 He speaks of the object, identifying characteristics
which, in the particular context, are appropriate to defend the
judgment that it is more or less beautiful. He genuinely opposes
anyone who denies his judgment. Because he proceeds in this
way, he can be distinguished from the individual who merely ex-
presses his taste. Such an individual declares that an object is, for
instance, beautiful to him. His statement is about himself. He does
not dispute those who say that an object is not beautiful to them.28
Such is the wisdom of the adage: De gustibus non est disputandum.
It is difficult to determine when someone speaks of the char-
acteristics of an object in such a way that he is within aesthetic
discourse. Theories of aesthetics attempt to identify rules deter-
mining what sorts of statements are within aesthetic discourse,
sometimes apparently without regard to any particular context.1 D
But, even if no adequate general theory is available or possible,
some individuals are adept at identifying characteristics that others
recognize as relevant to the judgment that an object is beautiful.
In the area of aesthetics the critic or expert is distinguished by
his ability to provide justifications for his statements which en-
courage others to acquiesce in his declarations. 0 These experts
make others aware of beautiful objects and of their relative im-
portance.2 1 They facilitate the development of consensus. Their
judgments stand up to review.
16. Id.; see, e.g., Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity,
71 Micn. L. Rav. 1438 (1973).
17. See, e.g., Slote, The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgments, 68 J. PHILOsoPHY
821 (1971):
[T]o say that something is aesthetically good (or great) is to say more than that
it can be desired by someone with aesthetic interests .... [F]or a work of art to
have aesthetic value or be aesthetically good is for it to have the disposition to
be responded to by desire to behold (or read or hear, etc.) it and liking for it in
appropriate beings in appropriate circumstances.
Id. at 834. See also H. PrrKIN, WITrGENSTEIN AND JuscrE 233-35 (1972).
18. See S. CAvELL, Musr WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 91-92 (1969).
19. Slote expresses a general theory of aesthetic values based upon the thesis that
they are dispositional properties of objects: "[F]or one work x to be aesthetically preferable
or superior to another work y is for the pair of works x and y to have the disposition to
be responded to by greater liking for x than for y in appropriate circumstances." Slote,
supra note 17, at 834. Theories within aesthetics might seek to identify and specify what
such dispositions are.
20. See S. CAVELL, supra note 18, at 91-92.
21. This claim may meet with the objection that in matters of beauty there is no
expertise. Such an objection was successfully challenged in the agency hearings considering
the Storm King development project. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 991 (1966). For
an account of how this objection was overcome and how the qualifications and testimony
of such experts were presented, see Sive, Securing, Examining, and Cross-Examining Ex.
pert Witnesses in Environmental Cases, 68 MscH. L. REV. 1175 (1970).
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Discourse with the properties of aesthetic discourse is no
stranger to the legal system." Discussions concerning what is just
or equitable are likely to reveal disputes among the participants.
Dispute is as possible and likely in these matters as it is in aesthetics.
Each speaker makes a claim that his proposal is just or right, and
that all who properly view the facts will see it his way. Uni-
versality is implicit in these judgments. Failure to observe this
characteristic has led to the confusion of discourse about what is
right or just with discourse about what is pleasing or expedient.2
The latter sorts of discussion involve taste and politics. Matters of
taste, as observed above, arise merely from the preferences of the
speaker. Matters of expedience are what can be effected in the
circumstances. Statements concerning these do not involve the
same claims as statements concerning justice or equity: matters
of taste are peculiar to the speaker and matters of expedience
invoke different criteria to decide what decision to make (e.g.,
what can be done, not what ought to be done).2
Far from being foreign to the legal system, the concepts of
justice and equity are basic to it. Definition and implementation
of what is right or just is seen as a societal requirement, even when
it is not pleasing or expedient to incorporate the requirement into
practice. Disputes can and must be resolved. Legislatures, agencies
and courts provide forums where discourse giving rise to consensus
takes place, where judgments can be reviewed and standards de-
veloped. Traditions dating back hundreds of years support many
If the preceding analysis is accurate, then reliance upon surveys of lay opinion can
be counter-productive. Unless they provide for a determination of whether the observer
expresses his taste or makes an aesthetic judgment, they will be misleading. They may
incorporate an egalitarian bias that places their findings beyond the laws protecting
"aesthetics." The same is true of efforts to make aesthetic values "objective" by viewing
them as recreational amenities evaluated in terms of user willingness to make expenditures
to observe them.
22. To affirm such a parallel between aesthetic and moral-legal discourse is not to
assert that these linguistical realms are identical. See Hampshire, Logic and Appreciation,
in ESSAYS IN AEsTrTIcS AND LANGUAGE 161 (W. Elton ed. 1954); Zemach, Thirteen Ways
of Looking at the Ethics-Aesthetics Parallelism, 26 J. AEsrlmncs & ART CIncism 891 (1966).
23. H. PITMN, supra note 17, at 225-40. Such a confused analysis is supposed to
have been expressed by Hume, and is found in Mill's Utilitarianism. See Wildavsky,
sup,ra note 14, for an example of an analysis that reduces matters of justice and aesthetics
to matters of preference and expedience.
24. Hobbesian theories of government, not at all foreign to contemporary political
theory, would collapse the distinction argued for, and assert that "justice" means nothing
more than what those in power desire to effect and can accomplish in the circumstances.
As long as it is recognized that criticism of current government makes sense, however, it
must be said that such a view does not adequately express the content of our present
concept of justice.
1979]
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of our present judgments concerning what is just. Only very re-
cently, however, have the same institutions been asked to decide
matters of aesthetics. NEPA is one result. But does it contribute to
the development of standards defining aesthetic values? Does it
contribute to the protection of aesthetic resources?
A. NEPA and Aesthetics
The limited legislative history of the National Environmental
Policy Act indicates that Congress intended to provide for the pro-
tection of aesthetics. Early hearings on the bill were guided by a
special report prepared by Professor Lynton K. Caldwell.2 In re-
sponse to the question, "Upon what considerations and values
should a national environmental policy be based?" Caldwell wrote:
[he cornerstone of environmental policy is ethical. That cornerstone
is the maintenance of an environment in which human life is not only
possible, but may be lived with the fullest possible measures of human
freedom, health, and esthetic satisfaction that can be found.26
Several witnesses during the initial hearings referred to the im-
portance of aesthetics in a national environmental policy. In par-
ticular, Dr. Philip Lee, acknowledging the importance of the
aesthetic needs of society and of economic and social welfare, de-
clared that health is not the only reason for environmental man-
agement. Laurance S. Rockefeller, the first witness to appear at
the joint hearings leading up to NEPA, said that there are limits
to the degradation of aesthetic values, even when it is necessary to
compromise environmental values in view of other national goals.28
25. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., 2D SEss., A NA-
TIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968).
26. Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the Environ-
ment, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House
Comm. on Science and Aeronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1968).
27. Id. at 41.
28. Id. at 9. Mr. Rockefeller had been chairman of the Citizens' Advisory Committee
on Preservation and Natural Beauty, and one may argue that he was a spokesman for
these values before the Joint Committee on Environmental Policy. In the maneuvering
surrounding the consideration of environmental policy legislation, President Nixon re-
placed the natural beauty committee with a committee having the same membership
called the "Citizens' Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality." This was put for-
ward as an alternative to the proposed Environmental Quality Council. Exec. Order No.
11,472, 3 C.F.R. 792 (1969), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 app., at 1721 (1976). Much of
the discussion at the hearings dealt with the relative merits of these proposals. See, e.g.,
Environmental Quality, Hearings on H.R. 6750, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm.,
U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1969) (statement of Russell E.
Train, Under-Secretary, Dep't of Interior).
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He proposed the balancing of competing needs, but did not identify
any standards to be used in this balancing.29 In later hearings Sen-
ator Hansen of Wyoming mentioned that the aesthetics of nature
were highly regarded in his state.3
0
Such expressions of concern for natural aesthetics continued
when the bill passed out of committee. When Senator Jackson re-
ported the bill to the Senate, he lamented "the loss of valuable
open spaces; . . . faltering and poorly designed transportation sys-
tems; poor architectural design and ugliness in public and private
structures; . . . an increasingly ugly landscape cluttered with
billboards, powerlines, and junkyards." 31 He expressed the view
that the proposed legislation would contribute to the remedy of
the situation: "Natural beauty, increased recreational opportunity,
urban esthetics and other amenities would be important byproducts
of a national environmental policy."3 2 The provisions to which he
referred were not affected by subsequent conference. Senator Jack-
son's report indicates that the references to aesthetics found in the
present Act reflect congressional intent to protect this environ-
mental characteristic.
Despite the indications of the legislative history, Congress did
not specify what sorts of aesthetic characteristics it intended to
protect, nor did it express the relative significance of the provisions
for aesthetic protection. Visual aesthetics seem to predominate in
the comments quoted above. But the Council on Environmental
Quality, which was given primary responsibility to review imple-
mentation of the Act,3 3 implies that aesthetic protection is merely
an aspect of overall environmental protection which does not war-
rant differentiation.3 4 The Council's approach is a consequence of
Congress' failure to specify what values are to be protected. Im-
29. Joint House-Senate Colloquium, supra note 26, at 49. Congress itself did not
spell out such standards and priorities in the final bill. See Note, The Least Adverse
Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HAtv. L. REv. 735, 746
(1975). Compare the standards set out in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1273 (b) (2) (1976): "Scenic river areas-Those rivers or sections of rivers that are free of
impoundments, with shorelines or watersheds still largely primitive and shorelines largely
undeveloped, but accessible in places by roads."
30. National Environmental Policy, Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1969).
31. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969).
32. Id. at 17.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1976).
34. 6 COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QuALTY ANN. RE'. 509 (1975). The study refers to pollution
damages to health, materials, vegetation, animals and recreation as having aesthetic con-
sequences.
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plicit in the Council's approach is the prospect that aesthetic values
will receive no special attention. They may be ignored because of
the supposed protection afforded through the protection of other
values.
B. NEPA and its Implementation
By enacting NEPA, Congress called upon federal agencies to
implement broad, vague policy objectives. This does not necessarily
render the Act ineffective. Congress has elsewhere directed specific
agencies to curtail "[u]nfair methods of competition" 85 and to pre-
vent fraud in securities transactions." In each case agencies with
special expertise-the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities
Exchange Commission-responded by developing regulations more
effectively curtailing the offensive practices than would have been
possible had Congress given them less flexible mandates. A more
detailed look at NEPA reveals, however, that its mandate is dif-
ferent in significant ways.
Section 10137 of the National Environmental Policy Act ex-
presses a broad policy aimed at the protection of the quality of
the human environment. The section enumerates many environ-
mental concerns in broad terms, without expressing their relative
significance. Aesthetic values are included in the enumeration.8
To effect the policy outlined in section 101, Congress directed
that the policies, regulations and public laws be administered, to
35. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1976).
36. Id. § 78j (b).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976). That section declares, in part, that it is the policy of
the federal government
to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in produc-
tive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331 (a).
38. To effect the broadly expressed policy expressed above, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (b)
(1976) declares that
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,
to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to
the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, pro-
ductive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.
Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 28
THE NEPA MODEL
the fullest extent possible, in accordance with that policy. In sec-
tion 102(c),39 it imposed a specific procedural requirement on all
agencies of the federal government. They must file an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) on proposals for major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.
4 0
Several features of NEPA should be noted. As in the regula-
tion of competition and securities transactions, Congress expressed
the protected values in broad terms with little further definition.
Effective implementation of such a generally expressed policy re-
quires the development of rules and decision-making devices to
interpret the policy in specific contexts. Unlike the earlier regula-
tions, however, the implementation of the general policy was not
given to specific agencies with special expertise, but was a supple-
mental mandate to the existing authority of federal agencies. 41
Finally, some of the terminology used in NEPA terms, such as
"major" and "significantly," seem to invite courts to develop com-
mon law definitions. Such characteristics make implementation
of its policies problematic.
The implementation of NEPA can be observed in the courts.
While NEPA itself does not provide for judicial review, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA)43 permits individuals whose in-
terests are arguably within the zone of interests protected by NEPA
to challenge the actions of any agency if the agency action would
injure their interests.44 Considerable litigation has taken place
39. Id. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
40. Id.; see Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453
F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926, 933 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 56-105 (1973).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (1976).
42.
A statute that imposes a complicated procedural requirement on all "proposals"
for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment" and then assiduously avoids giving any hint, either expressly or by
way of legislative history, of what is meant by a "proposal" or by a "major
Federal action" can hardly be termed precise. In fact, this vaguely worded statute
seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a "common
law" of NEPA. To date, the courts have responded in just that manner and have
created such a "common law."
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 890, 420-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
44. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." Id. § 702. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971); K. DAvis, 4 ADMINisimnvE LAW TRaATisE §§ 28.05-.06 (1958).
1979]
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under this provision. The amount of litigation is not a guide to
the effectiveness of NEPA, however. Early in the history of NEPA,
Justice Douglas warned that superficial enforcement of the Act in
the courts might render "the mandate of NEPA . .. only a ritual
and like the peppercorn a mere symbol that has no vital mean-
ing."45
Initially, the courts generally ignored the substantive pro-
visions of section 101 and interpreted NEPA as a mere environ-
mental full disclosure law.46 They focused upon the formal re-
quirement that the agencies file adequate environmental impact
statements, perhaps because the congressional debates had em-
phasized the structural provisions of the Act,4 7 and because of the
action-forcing, procedural requirements of section 102.48 But if this
interpretation is accepted, only limited environmental protection
can result. It does not impose any standards upon the agencies in
their determinations of whether, or how, to execute a project. Court
review is limited to determining whether the agency accepted its
responsibility to file the statement and whether a statement is ade-
quately formulated.
The sort of success achieved by the courts in this context is
instructive. Studies have shown that the implementation of the
EIS requirement of NEPA was a function of two variables: how
closely the environmental concern of NEPA paralleled the original
mandates of each agency, and the extent of court-imposed compli-
ance.49 Even the EIS requirements of NEPA would not have been
extensively implemented if it had not been for the intervention of
the courts.
Court efforts to effect the substantive policies of NEPA are
45. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926, 933 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Note, Tilting
at the Environmental Windmill-The Quest for a Substantive Right to a Clean Environ-
ment, 9 SuFFoLK L. Rgv. 1286 (1975).
46. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 348 F. Supp. 916
(N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 6750, supra note 28.
48. S. Rae. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1969).
49. See, e.g., R. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 74-141 (1976),
Karp, Substantive Rights Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 13 Am. Bus. L.J.
289 (1976); Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Response,
16 NAT. R SOURCES J. 263 (1976). But see Dreyfus & Ingram, The National Environmental
Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. REsOURCES J. 243 (1976).
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still very limited. 0 Substantive review has sometimes been sub rosa,
effected by requiring the redevelopment of environmental impact
statementsY' At other times it has been avowedly substantive, 2
usually employing the "arbitrary" and "capricious" standards of
the Administrative Procedure Act.5 3 Even this review has been
halting, since the courts have seldom actually applied the pro-
visions of section 101 as the source of law. Instead, they have in-
voked a standard of "fairness" or considered general environmental
concerns such as "pollution." 54
If the agencies were hesitant to comply with the procedural
requirements of NEPA without court intervention, it is unlikely
that they have been vigorous in effecting its substantive policy
objectives. Studies of agency compliance with the substantive pro-
visions of the Act are limited in scope."- As an alternative to in-
dividual investigation of the various agencies, the remainder of
50. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd sub noma.,
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473
F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Karp, supra note 49, at
293-95; Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Genera-
tion of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D. L. REv. 279 (1974);
Note, supra note 45.
51. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100, 112 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 639 (D. Vt.
1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd,
531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976); Akers v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (W.D. Tenn. 1972);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971),
injunc. vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (ED. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972);
Wharton, Judicially Enforceable Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 415
(1976).
52. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd sub nom., KIeppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Conservation Council of N.C. v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (A) (1976). For a review of the diversity of standards employed
by the courts which invoke this rubric, see Wharton, supra note 51, at 423-26, and Karp,
supra note 49, at 299. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) suggests that
this is the proper standard, but that review is properly limited to procedural matters.
54. Karp, supra note 49, at 305; see, e.g., Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
55. Some specific studies have appeared in the Council on Environmental Quality
Annual Reports, which are intended to report generally the consequences of activities upon
the environment. See, e.g., 6 COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY 627-28 (1975). See also M. BACLEY,
C. KROLL & K. CLARK, AEsTHTIcs IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING C(Environmental Protection
Agency, Off. of Research and Dev.) (1973).
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this study will focus upon court-imposed implementation of the
provisions of NEPA with regard to aesthetic values.
II. NEPA, AESTHETIC PROTECTION AND THE COURTS
A. Aesthetics and Standing
Some limited protection of aesthetic values can be inferred
from the fact that, under the Administrative Procedure Act, NEPA
will provide a plaintiff with standing to protect his aesthetic inter-
ests. In fact, aesthetics raise a particular threat to agencies that
would rather avoid review, since aesthetics appear to provide a
plaintiff with ready access to the courts.
It should be noted that, even before NEPA's enactment, plain-
tiffs were able to gain standing to protect their aesthetic interests.
In cases where the statutes involved did not specifically mention
aesthetics, the courts had determined that the zone of protected
interests sometimes extended beyond economic interests to include
"aesthetic, conservational, and recreational" values.0
Sierra Club v. Morton57 is one such case. It arose as a result of
the Forest Service's licensing activities in connection with the de-
velopment of a ski resort by Disney Enterprises in the Sierra
Nevada mountains adjacent to the Sequoia National Forest. The
Sierra Club invoked various statutes regulating National Parks
and Forest Service regulations.6 It alleged, as summarized by the
court, that an injury would occur "entirely by reason of the change
in the uses to which Mineral King will be put, and the attendant
change in the aesthetics and ecology of the area.""0 The Supreme
Court accepted this allegation as sufficient to provide a plaintiff
with standing: "We do not question that this type of harm may
amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing
56. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970).
57. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
58. These included limitations upon acreage in construction permits (16 U.S.C.
§ 497), regulations of the use of park lands for non-park purposes (id. § 1), proscriptions
against the destruction of protected timber and other resources (id. §§ 41, 43), and regu-
lations requiring public hearings on such a project. 405 U.S. at 730 n.2.
59. 405 U.S. at 734. "Mineral King" refers to the Mineral King Valley area of the
Sierra Nevada Mountains-the area where the ski resort was to be built.
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under § 10 of the APA."0 However, the holding in the Mineral
King case was that the Sierra Club did not have standing. It had not
specifically alleged that it or its members would be injured by the
action."'
In reaching its decision the Court rejected arguments that a
public interest group such as the Sierra Club may bring suit as a
public representative without alleging an injury to itself. 62 Thus,
the case brings out the fact that when a plaintiff challenges agency
action, standing does not arise because of the injury to the environ-
ment itself, but because of the injury to the party bringing suit. 3
It rejects the view that "environmental issues [should] be litigated
before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inani-
mate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads
and bulldozers." 4
After the Mineral King case, NEPA provided the plaintiffs
with standing in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP).65 The SCRAP organization con-
tended that NEPA required the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) to file an environmental impact statement before declining
to suspend a surcharge on railroad freight rates.66 Invoking an
"attenuated" line of causation, it claimed that a general rate in-
crease would
cause increased use of nonrecyclable commodities as compared to
recyclable goods, thus resulting in the need to use more natural re-
sources to produce such goods, some of which resources might be taken
from the Washington area, and resulting in more refuse that might
be discarded in national parks in the Washington area.67
60. Id. The Court also expressed a value judgment in dicta which later became con-
trolling: "Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important
ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving
of legal protection through the judicial process." Id.
61. Id. at 735-37.
62. Id. at 734-35.
63. This "homeocentric" viewpoint has been castigated in several works. Among
them are C. STONE, SHouLD TREs HAVE STANDING? ToWARD LEGAL RIGuTs FOR NATURAL
Onj'crs (1974); and Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). But see Hughes, Who's Standing?
Problems with Inanimate Plaintiffs, 4 ENvr'L L. 315 (1974). This is not to deny that, out-
side NEPA and the APA, damage to aesthetic values can support an action to enforce,
e.g., zoning regulations protecting aesthetics.
64. 405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
66. Id. at 679.
67. Id. at 688.
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In addition to alleging such harm to the environment, the SCRAP
organization alleged that its members used the areas which were
endangered by the ICC action and that their aesthetic, recrea-
tional and economic interests would be harmed if the agency were
allowed to proceed. The Supreme Court granted standing on the
basis of the alleged injury to the plaintiffs' aesthetic interests.00 It
made it clear that when standing is at issue, very minimal standards
apply as to whether genuine interests are threatened.70 Whereas the
Mineral King case made it clear that the protection of aesthetic
values may not be sought for their own sake, SCRAP suggests that
individuals who allege injury to their aesthetic interests can gain
access to the federal courts under NEPA so long as their injury
might be subject to proof at trial.71 Issues of principle may then be
decided.7s
Under NEPA, plaintiffs have acquired standing on the basis
of their aesthetic interests to challenge such agency actions as filling
of marshes,7" and the failing to remove abandoned dikes from San
Francisco Bay; 74 mining and timbering,75 and building roads al-
68. Id. at 675-76. "Specifically, they claimed that the rate structure would discourage
the use of 'recyclable' materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that compete
with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by encouraging unwarranted
mining, lumbering, and other extractive activities." Id. at 676.
69. Id. at 690.
70. The Court cites with approval: "The basic idea that comes out in numerous
cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of prin-
ciple; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation." Id.
at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 613
(1968).
71. 412 U.S. at 689.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Committee for Green Foothills v. Froehlke, 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1849 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). The committee alleged that "[ilts members frequently visit[ed] the Bay's shores
for purposes such as hiking, birdwatching, and the general enjoyment of the scenery,
natural surroundings and wildlife. . . . Plaintiff [had] therefore alleged both 'injury in
fact' to a cognizable interest, and that it [was] itself among the injured." Id. at 1852.
Motion for preliminary injunction was denied, however, on the basis of the court's balanc-
ing of equities. Id. at 1857.
74. Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 354 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The dikes in
question had been abandoned, were allegedly improperly constructed, and were contribut-
ing to a buildup of sediment in the bay.
75. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1971). In issue was the Otter Creek Basin, which was to be managed under a
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield plan (submitted by the Regional Forester) permitting min-
ing and timber-cutting activities. Conservancy, the plaintiff, had developed a special interest
in the area and used it extensively for educational purposes. It "sought to protect the
same conservational interests with which the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Wilderness Act are concerned." Id. at 234.
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legedly affecting the black bear population in the Monongahela
National Forest; 76 interfering with off-tract recreational uses of
land in a federally licensed development project; 77 threatening the
wild horse population in a region of Nevada;7 8 constructing a
highway in the Wisconsin, Lake Kettle Moraine area; 79 and selling
timber and building a paper mill in the North Tongass National
Forest in Alaska.80 The diversity of these actions, all permitting a
plaintiff to sue to protect his aesthetic interests without putting
him to proof or definition, suggests that the diversity inherent in
judgments concerning aesthetic values makes the ability to protect
one's aesthetic interests a valuable asset to those attempting to pro-
tect the environment generally and a special threat to those who
would prefer to avoid review.
76. Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. W.Va. 1972). Several of the plaintiffs in-
cluded reference to aesthetic interests in their allegations supporting standing, e.g., "her
interests in the Monongahela National Forest are aesthetic, ecological and hiking purposes,
all of which will be irreparably damaged by the proposed road construction." Id. at 311.
The court observed:
While the stated objective of plaintiffs is to obtain a judgment declaring the road
construction in issue unlawful, the practical goal is to compel the United States
Forest Service to prepare, circulate and consider an environmental impact state-
ment, further developing the various factors which plaintiffs believe are important
to the decision making process incidental to the location of a forest roadway.
Plaintiffs thereby urge the preservation of the rugged, pioneer styled, primitive
wilderness, and they believe this is conducive to the propagation and preservation
of the black bear population in West Virginia.
Id.
77. Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1974). Here, the
action was to prevent a private developer from developing private land located on the
flood plain of the Missouri River. Plaintiffs wanted access to the courts in order to dem-
onstrate that federal action would be required by, e.g., the Corps of Engineers for the
approval of a levee and that NEPA would therefore apply. The plaintiffs contended that
they used the tract for the viewing of open space and the natural environment, which
they contended provided an aesthetic and psychological benefit. In reversing the lower
court's denial of standing, the court of appeals criticized its reliance upon Sierra Club
and noted that the plaintiffs' allegations asserted injury beyond mere displeasure. Id. at
157. Implicitly, the court was declaring that aesthetics, not mere taste, was involved.
78. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Frizzell, 403 F. Supp. 1206 (D. Nev. 1975).
Invoking SCRAP's standard for injury in fact no matter how attenuated the line of causa-
tion from agency action to injury, the court granted standing to the organization on the
basis of the fact that it named a Nevada member "who has viewed and desires to con-
tinue to view the wild horses in Stone Cabin Valley." Id. at 1214.
79. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.
1972). The district court found: "The immediate effects of the construction now in prog-
ress include damage to present natural habitats of various wild animals; stripping of
forested land with attendant erosion problems; increased levels of noise, air and water
pollution; impingement upon the aesthetic natural beauty and recreational value of the
area." Id. at 884.
80. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971).
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B. Aesthetics and Whether to File an EIS
A somewhat more direct form of environmental protection is
provided in cases where the courts find that aesthetic values are
sufficiently threatened so that an agency is required to file an En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS). The most specific requirement
imposed upon an agency under NEPA when it proposes a major
federal action which significantly affects the environment 8' is the
filing of an EIS;, courts have shown the greatest willingness to in-
tervene at this juncture."2 While some have limited their review
to the arbitrary and capricious standard,m  others have adopted
more demanding standards.8 4 Some maintain that an agency has
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1976). A long-term debate has developed whether the ac-
tion involved needs to be both "major" and "significant" or if these standards are separ-
able. See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975). For a case
invoking the radical distinction, see Township of Ridley v. Blanchette, 421 F. Supp. 435,
445-47 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In discussing the meaning of "significantly," the court in Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), interprets this word as indicating that the Con-
gress intended the action to have greater impact than would result from any "major Fed-
eral action" and adopted the following standard:
In the absence of any Congressional or administrative interpretation of the
term, we are persuaded that in deciding whether a major federal action will "sig-
nificantly" affect the quality of the human environment the agency in charge,
although vested with broad discretion, should normally be required to review the
proposed action in the light of at least two relevant factors: (I) the extent to
which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those cre-
ated by existing uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative
adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm
that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the
affected area.
Id. at 830-31.
82. The standard of proof invoked by the court becomes especially critical at this
juncture. For a general consideration of the issues involved at this step in NEPA litiga.
tion, see Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr., eds. 1970); Comment, Negative NEPA: The
Decision Not to File, 6 ENV'L L. 309 (1975).
83. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976), adopts this standard with respect
to an agency determination of whether a "region" is involved in a proposal for mining
coal in the Northern plains, this being a matter requiring a high degree of technical ex-
pertise. It also suggests that review generally might be limited to this standard. Id. at 410
n.21. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
908 (1973).
84. see, e.g., Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973);
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1973); Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358 (3rd Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973); Patterson v. Exxon, 415 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Neb. 1976);
McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (WD. Mo. 1973); Minnesota Pub. Interest Re-
search Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
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no discretion in the matter.s5 Whatever standard is invoked, if
it is satisfied, a court can prevent the agency from proceeding with
its project.""
The cases in this area indicate that aesthetic values may enter
into a court's determination of whether a proposed action requires
an agency to file an EIS. But, it is also at this juncture that it be-
comes clear that a legislature must do more than merely mention
aesthetic values if it hopes to insure their protection.
One of the earliest cases on the subject dealt with the effect
of NEPA on the principal mandate of the various agencies. Ely v.
Velde17 held, partly on the basis of the strength of the congressional
policy for protecting the aesthetic character of the environment,
that NEPA required the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA) to file an EIS before approving a grant to support a
medical and recreation center for prisoners in Virginia. LEAA
had alleged that it had a mandate not to consider any factors except
those mentioned in its enabling legislation.8 But, in the face of
allegations by residents of the area that the project would affect
scenic and historic qualities of Virginia, 9 the court reconsidered
85. Such an interpretation seems to be supported by the language of the statute:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . (C) include in every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed state-
ment by the responsible official on [those effects].
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976). The issue becomes primarily a question of law, or a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975); City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz,
484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th
Cir. 1972); Patterson v. Exxon, 415 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Neb. 1976); Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn. 1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla. v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp.
69 (E.D. Okla. 1974), af'd, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom., Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886
(W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2) (1976).
87. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 1133.
89. The district court described the area as follows:
Green Springs is an area of land consisting of approximately 10,000 acres
located in the western part of Louisa County. It is a uniquely historical and archi-
tecturally significant rural community in that almost all of the homes were built
in the nineteenth century and have been maintained in substantially the same
condition ever since. Three of the homes, Boswell's Tavern, Hawkwood, and
Westend, are on the National Register for Historical Places . ...
Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (E.D. Va. 1971) (footnote omitted). In summarizing
the case, the court said: "In effect, the plaintiffs live in a very beautiful area of Virginia,
and don't want the area 'ruined' by the construction of a large penal facility." Id. at 1095.
The district court did not find this a legally cognizable interest. Id. at 1095.
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this supposed limitation and required the agency to file an impact
statement considering aesthetic factors 0
In another early case, Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal
Power Comm'n,91 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
considered action of the FPC that permitted, among other things,92
the construction of three overhead transmission lines. The FPC
had granted final approval to two of the lines and was proceeding
to approve the third. Although it was the federal agency respon-
sible for the project, it had not made its own investigation of the
environmental impact of the project. Rather, it had relied upon
studies conducted by the Power Authority of the State of New
York (PASNY). The Commission supplemented the studies by an
inspection of affected areas before approving the two lines." It
had "concluded that from an aesthetic and environmental values
point of view, the selected locations of the two lines involved
herein are preferable to all of the alternative routings that were
considered." '94 In the view of the court, this procedure satisfied the
substantive provisions of NEPA.9 5 Because of this and the fact that
the plaintiff-petitioners had permitted the FPC to enter the final
order with respect to these two lines before objecting to their con-
struction, the court did not halt the remaining twenty percent of
construction.96 The third line, however, had not yet been finally
approved. The court enjoined further construction of this line in
the absence of an EIS because the FPC, by substituting the PASNY
statement for one of its own, had abdicated its responsibility to
consider environmental values throughout its decision-making
processY.9 The court exhibited greater concern for the integrity of
90. 451 F.2d at 1135-36.
91. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
92. The proposed project involved a 1,000,000 kilowatt pumped storage generating
station with two reservoirs, a powerhouse and three transmission lines from the power-
house to three substations. Id. at 415-16.
93. Id. at 416-17.
94. Id. at 416.
95. The court noted that in preparing its report, the state agency had relied upon
the FPC's own guidelines for the protection of scenic and recreational values. Id. at 425.
96. Id. at 424-25.
97. Id. at 420 (citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The Second Circuit developed a line of cases
under which the critical question was whether the federal agency responsible for a project
was the author of the EIS. In 1975 Congress acted to relieve any such requirement. Pub.
L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (D) (1976)). The Second
Circuit retreated from its rule in Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. Inc. v. Secretary of Transp.,
531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the procedure imposed by Congress than for environmental values.
In Scherr v. Volpe,98 the plaintiffs challenged the upgrading
of a twelve-mile stretch of highway from two to four lanes. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the Federal
Highway Administration's unsubstantiated determination that the
project would have no significant impact on the environment. One
of the findings of the district court for purposes of the motion for
preliminary injunction had been: "The immediate effects of the
construction now in progress include damages to present natural
habitats of various wild animals; stripping of forested land with
attendant erosion problems; increased levels of noise, air and water
pollution; impingement upon the esthetic natural beauty and rec-
reational value of the area." 99 On motion to suspend the injunc-
tion,100 the district court made these findings moot by rejecting the
contention that the plaintiff had to show that the decision to build,
despite environmental consequences, was arbitrary, asserting that
they need only show the agency's failure to assemble information,
subject it to scrutiny and articulate an evaluation.1 1 The circuit
court saw the procedural requirements of section 102 as the pri-
mary vehicle for implementing section 101.102 The injunction was
found proper, even without a finding of irreparable harm to the
environment, in view of the finding that otherwise the opportunity
for careful decision-making would be lost forever? 8
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v.
U.S. Postal Service'0 dramatically illustrates the ineffectiveness of
NEPA's mention of aesthetic values as a vehicle for ensuring their
protection, and it displays the unwillingness of the courts to adopt
an active role in the definition of aesthetics without specific direc-
tion. The case arose as a review of the Postal Service's failure to
file an EIS in connection with the construction of a bulk mailing
facility. In this case the court adopted two standards of review: one
applying to aesthetic values, the other to "measurable" environ-
mental factors.
The Planning Board of Prince George's County, Maryland,
98. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
99. 336 F. Supp. 882, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
100. Id. at 886.
101. Id. at 889.
102. 466 F.2d at 1031.
103. Id. at 1034.
104. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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brought the potential visual and aesthetic detriment of the pro-
posed postal facility to the attention of the court in an effort to
gain a preliminary injunction because of the failure to file an En-
vironmental Impact Statement. The proposed construction project
would, it said, place a parking and loading facility within view of
the Capital Beltway, a major highway. The Board had found that,
although the area was zoned for an industrial park, the postal
facility was not in conformity with a zoning ordinance insofar as
"[g]ood visibility, prestige location and other related factors were
not indicated as necessary for this facility by the Post Office."'1
"Campus-like" settings were intended for the site in question.100
In an "environmental assessment," the Postal Service had deter-
mined that landscaping for aesthetic effect would make the impact
such that no EIS would be required. It also determined that po-
tential run-off of water and oil were probably insignificant.107
Expressing the standards that should govern a reviewing court
when an agency has failed to file an EIS, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia declared that a presumption of sig-
nificance may arise when a federal agency overrides local zoning
regulations that actually deal with the quality of the human en-
vironment.108 Accordingly, it called for a "hard look" at a decision
not tofile an EIS in such a case. But it made an exception where
the local concern was with aesthetics. It asked: Could Congress
have intended that an Environmental Impact Statement be required
for each new federal construction project because of the possibility
that it would be ugly, even to most of the beholders? Its answer was
no. "[A] 'substantial inquiry' or 'hard look' was not contemplated,
as a matter of reasonable construction of NEPA, where the claim
of NEPA application is focused on alleged esthetic impact . . .,.
This position was somewhat qualified. The court distinguished an
aesthetic impact like the one in issue, one which had "no" effect
on the environment, from aesthetic impacts pertaining to recrea-
105. Id. at 1033.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1040-42.
108. Id. at 1036-37, see Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th
Cir. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Goose Hollow Foothills League v.
Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971). But see Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp.
344 (D. Conn. 1972).
109. 487 F.2d at 1038-39.
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tion areas and attractive scenic views.11 Conceivably, the latter
would deserve a "hard look." The court supported its conclusion
with the blatant positivism so precious to economic analysis. It
noted that some questions of aesthetics, including the one in issue,
are, like psychological factors, "not readily translatable into con-
crete measuring rods.""" Assuming that a detailed analysis using
such concrete measuring rods was required for a section 102 (C)
impact statement, the court declared that Congress could not have
intended a "hard look" at agency determinations not to file an EIS
when aesthetic values were in question. It also affirmed that the
matters involved in the case pertained essentially to issues of in-
dividual and potentially diverse taste,12 speaking as though this
standard corresponded to its rule that only attractive scenic views
could invoke critical review.
In terms of the distinction between aesthetics and taste de-
veloped above, the court here was saying, at best, that in this case
matters of taste were involved and that such matters were not sub-
ject to close scrutiny under NEPA. If this is so, then it was im-
proper for it to say, as it did,"3 that with regard to such matters
the scope of review of a lower court decision or agency determina-
tion is limited. Neither a court nor an agency is entitled to offer
any protection to mere matters of taste, but only to matters of
aesthetics. The tests the court used to determine whether the
question was one of taste or aesthetics-whether there is a possi-
bility of diversity in judgment as to the beauty of the matter in
question, whether concrete measuring rods are available and
whether recreational areas or "attractive scenic expanses" were in-
volved-are not dictated by NEPA nor by the nature of aesthetics.
They appear to be derived from a misunderstanding of the nature
of aesthetics and from the court's introduction of its own standards
as to what vistas deserve protection. No expert judgments were
required, and the legislative judgment of the Planning Board was
ignored.
110. Id. at 1038 n.5. It is difficult, in view of Senator Jackson's remarks, see text
accompanying notes 31-32 supra, to support any distinction between protection of rural
and urban settings.
111. 487 F.2d at 1038 (quoting Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833 n.10, cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), a case in which the court discounted the supposed psycho-
logical effects of having a jail located dose to residential apartments).
112. 487 F.2d 1038-39.
113. Id.
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In contrast to its holding with regard to aesthetics, the court
noted "that in cases involving genuine issues as to health, and
environmental resources, there is a relatively low threshold for
impact statements .. .".114 Maryland-National exhibits the dan-
gers involved in Congress' failure to express any ordering among
the environmental values protected under NEPA or to set any
standards to be applied. The court makes it clear that it could
have issued an injunction against the Postal Service if it had been
governed by legislatively devised zoning restrictions based on the
same aesthetic considerations which it finds inadequate here."8
In a case involving a question of law similar to that in Ely v.
Velde," 6 an apparent conflict between the mandate of the Housing
and Urban Development Administration (HUD) to approve and
register developer statements under the Interstate Land Sales Act
within thirty days after their receipt,71  and the NEPA mandate
that agencies prepare an EIS before taking major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the environment, the court
resolved the issue against the EIS requirement in favor of the
registration requirement."8 The case involved the development
of a state designated "scenic river," which would, in the words of
the district court, have
actual or potential substantial effect upon the depth and course of the
Illinois River, its tributaries and drainage area, to the plant life, the
wildlife habitats, the fish and wildlife, soils, air, esthetics of the area
and upon the socio-economic conditions in the area including such
matters as health and hospital care and facilities, roads and highways,
schools, police and fire protection." 9
It therefore concluded the action was one of those which required
agencies to comply with NEPA to the fullest extent possible, de-
claring that in such cases the agencies have no discretion as to
whether to file. 2  The Supreme Court held, on the contrary, that
114. Id. at 1040.
115. Id. at 1038.
116. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). See notes 87-90 & accompanying text supra.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1706 (1976).
118. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
119. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla. v. Lynn, 382 F. Supp. 69, 73 (E.D. Okla. 1974),
modified, 520 F.2d 240 (1975), rev'd sub noma. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n
of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976). The Court specifically found that the area did possess sub-
stantial aesthetic qualities and that these provided the reason for the development pro-
posal. Id.
120. Id. at 75.
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the registration requirement was an agency authorization in clear
and unavoidable conflict with the section 102 requirement, so that
the agency could not possibly file a time-consuming impact state-
ment. 2'
In a more recent case the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the allegation that a low income housing project would
adversely affect aesthetics in a white neighborhood.122 Plaintiffs had
alleged that the housing project would bring in a social class with
a "disregard for physical and aesthetic maintenance of real and
personal property."'1 The parties in this case agreed to the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, which the court accepted as
appropriate in view of the "uncertainties" involved in the environ-
mental problems of the city as contrasted with problems such as
clean air and clear water.12 Under this standard of review, it was
enough for the court to find that HUD had considered the impact
of the project on the social fabric of the neighborhood and on the
physical environment,125 and that the record showed the factors on
which HUD had based its determination of no significant impact. 26
The district courts have championed aesthetic values to about
the same degree as illustrated in these higher court cases. 27 The
aesthetic consequences of a wall extending 150 feet from shore at
121. 426 U.S. at 791.
122. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
123. Id. at 228. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, claimed to have "a high regard
for the physical and aesthetic improvement of real and personal property." Id.
124. Id. at 229-30 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369,
1377 (7th Cir. 1973) and Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828-30 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1972)).
125. 524 F.2d at 231.
126. Id.
127. Two additional higher court cases might be noted: In the memorandum ex-
planatory of its remand of Saunders v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 486
F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (memorandum reported at 6 ERC 1111), the circuit court ex-
pressed a somewhat broader view, than in Scherr. The case was concerned with the aes-
thetics of noise. Although brought under a different statute, (the Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Authority, Article VI, 14 (c) (1)), the court showed willingness to force
agency consideration of this aesthetic value and required the publication of an assessment
of environmental impact.
Canal Authority of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974) involved a section
of Florida described by President Nixon as "[a) natural treasure ... a uniquely beautiful,
semi-tropical stream, one of a very few of its kind in the United States .. " Id. at 570
(footnote omitted). The issue before the court was the denial of the defendant's motion
to modify a preliminary injunction preventing it from lowering the level of Lake Ockla-
waha. The court disposed of the issue by considering the standards a lower court should
apply when denying such a motion, without referring to the purported beauty of the area.
Id. at 572-73.
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a height of seven to ten feet above sea level was one of the fac-
tors-along with impact upon surfing, surfing instruction and fish-
ing, and the removal of substantial amounts of sand and gravel
from the site-which induced the court to order the Corps of En-
gineers to develop an EIS before licensing a power station on
Oahu. 128 The loss of the existing view of nearby mountains caused
by a proposed high rise student dormitory was listed as a factor
indicating that the proposed action had a "significant" effect on
the environment in Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney.1 2
The spraying of water hyacinths by the Corps of Engineers on the
St. John's River in Florida, although admittedly having aesthetic
and ecological effects, was of insufficient impact to warrant a pre-
liminary injunction, but it did require an impact statement.1 0 In
Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Volpe,18 1 the
beauty of the Vermont area affected by the proposed highway was
a significant motive for the court when it ruled, on the basis of the
applicability of NEPA to ongoing projects not approved until after
the effective date of NEPA, that the Department of Transportation
was required to file an EIS before proceeding with its plans.182 In
128. Mahelona v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (D. Hawaii 1976).
129. 334 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1971). The court found that the agency involved,
HUD, had not weighed the consequences to the environment or the existing view and had
therefore acted arbitrarily. Id. at 879. Cf. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F.
Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (ruling that plaintiffs, who alleged a mock Marine Corps landing
would result in ecological and aesthetic damage to dune grass, lichens and moss, had failed
to show significant impact and that the Navy had considered these factors to such an ex-
tent that its determination not to file an EIS exhibited good faith compliance with the
substantive and procedural requirements of the Act).
130. Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The spraying project was, in
this case, a long standing practice aimed at protecting navigability of the river, a project
which could not reasonably be replaced. The Corps admitted environmental impact, but
defended on the ground that the project was initiated prior to NEPA and was ongoing.
The court refrained from saying what environmental factors should be considered in the
report it ordered. Id. at 396-97 n.27.
131. 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972).
132. Id. at 767-68. In considering whether the plaintiffs had made a prima facie
showing of the environmental significance of the project, Judge Oakes discerned a peculiar
ability of Vermonters to
desire to conserve nature in many instances for unabashed aesthetic reasons and
hold that these are basic, necessary and indeed do define the nature of man on a
par with energetics, economics or any other reason; moreover we have Gorky's
charge that aesthetics will be the ethics of the future.
Id. at 768 (quoting D. WErmPEE, R. COPPINGER & R. WALSH, TIME LAPsE ECOLOGY,
MUsnaGEr IsLAN, NANTUCKET, MASSACHUSrrs (1972)). These attitudes had to give way,
despite the fact that a federal judge "might have come to a different conclusion," when
Judge Oakes was presented with an EIS which showed a "good faith" weighing of the
environmental impact of the project. 362 F. Supp. 627, 636 (D. Vt. 1973), aff'd, 508 F.2d
927 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976). The
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Hendrickson v. Wilson' 33 the court first granted a preliminary in-
junction, 3 4 and then permitted the Corps of Engineers to issue,
without filing an impact statement, a permit to expand the Leland
Harbor in Michigan. Despite the fact that the permit ultimately
facilitated a larger project which, in the words of the court, would
radically alter the "picturesque" community, the court determined
that the Corps could not have seen its action as a "major" federal
action at the time it decided not to file an EIS. 3 5
Ohio v. Callaway186 exhibits reliance upon aesthetic values in
a unique manner. Most of the issues concerning dam projects
along the Ohio River tributaries were clear and a preliminary in-
junction against further construction of certain projects was issued
pending an adequate EIS. However, in fashioning relief, the court
noted that environmental damage-the unattractive appearance of
the construction areas-existed. To minimize this impact, it refused
to suspend most of the work in progress. 3 7 If this course were
more often employed, the intent of NEPA to protect environ-
mental values generally could be undermined in the name of
aesthetics.
A review of the cases dealing with the issue of whether NEPA
requires the filing of an environmental impact statement reveals
how indefinite a standard Congress provided when it listed aesthetic
impact as one of the matters of concern. The NEPA requirement
that federal agencies file an EIS whenever they propose a major
federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment is generally a definite standard requiring definite action.
Consequently, the courts have been most active in directing agency
action here. 38 But, when the NEPA litigation involves concern for
aesthetics, the courts have acted less predictably. They begin to
distinguish between more and less serious environmental conse-
quences, relegating aesthetic injury to the latter category. 39 So
court did continue the injunction, but on the ground that Greene County Planning
Comm'n required that the responsible federal agency write the EIS. Id. at 630-31. See
note 97 supra.
133. 374 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
134. Id. at 868.
135. Id. at 873. In view of this finding, the court determined that the decision of the
Corps not to file an EIS was not arbitrary or capricious. Id.
136. 364 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ohio 1973), modified, 497 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1974). The
court was upheld with respect to its tailoring of relief. 497 F.2d at 1241.
137. 364 F. Supp. at 302.
138. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 104-12 supra.
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strong is this inclination that aesthetic consequences alone have
never precipitated a court directive to file an EIS. Only where
other environmental matters are also in issue, or where other
federal policies-such as the protection of historical buildings--1 40
are involved, will the courts order an EIS. 141 When they are moti-
vated by the beauty of an affected area, they are apt to base their
decisions upon other standards, the now discredited "lead agency"
concept,14 2 for instance, or the applicability of NEPA to projects
commenced before NEPA was enacted. 48 If a court lacks such
motivation, it is more likely to invoke other grounds for its decision
not to require an EIS, for example, the "foreseeability" of a major
federal action.1 The courts can go so far as to permit damage to
other environmental characteristics in the name of aesthetic pro-
tection. 45 Such decisions appear to reflect the elasticity of the con-
cept of aesthetics more than critical evaluations of differing aes-
thetic impacts: references to aesthetics most often appear as findings
of ultimate fact without supporting facts.
C. Substantive Review to Protect Aesthetic Values.
When an agency is granted primary regulatory responsibility
for an area, court review de novo is limited. Yet, the courts do
have a role to play beyond that so far discussed. Under NEPA, the
courts might also determine that an agency in charge of a project
has not filed an adequate environmental impact statement. In some
cases, this can be considered a form of substantive review, because
it forces greater consideration of an environmental characteristic.
The courts might also make an avowedly substantive determina-
tion that an agency has not adequately protected environmental
values. 6 Substantive review of either of these sorts has been limited
under NEPA, and few of the cases where it has occurred involved
questions of aesthetics.
Prior to NEPA, aesthetic values figured prominently in a
court-imposed reconsideration of a major power plant project
140. See note 89 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
142. See notes 97 & 132 supra.
143. See note 130 supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
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licensed by the Federal Power Commission. The case, Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n,147 on the
one hand illustrates the promise of an activist court directed by
NEPA and, on the other, places into relief the paucity of subse-
quent review.
In Scenic Hudson the petitioners sought to set aside orders of
the FPC permitting Consolidated Edison to develop its Storm
King electrical generating project. They alleged that the project
would harm the "unique beauty and major historical significance"
of the lower Hudson Valley.148 The court ruled in their favor, re-
lying upon section 10 of the Federal Power Act. 49 That Act per-
mits the FPC to grant a power plant license only when the plan
provides for the improvement of recreational uses of the affected
areas. The court held that "recreational uses" is a term that en-
compasses the preservation of natural beauty. 50 Consequently, it
set aside the licenses, citing among its reasons the fact that the com-
mission had not considered the undergrounding of certain power
lines, an economically feasible alternative that would have pro-
tected aesthetics.
The court remanded the case to the FPC for further hearings.
A major issue at these hearings was the aesthetic impact of the
proposed plant and of overhead transmission lines. 5' The plan
was altered to provide that transmission lines would be placed
underground in certain areas. In addition, the power plant was
partially relocated so that structures would be less obtrusive. Where
locations still affected the view, cosmetic steps were taken.
On appeal after remand, the court approved of these changes
without substituting its own judgment.' By this time, the newly
enacted NEPA provided a source of law in addition to the Federal
Power Act. 58 The court focused directly upon section 101 of
NEPA. Although it stated that the Act required the Commission
147. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
148. Id. at 613.
149. 16 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (1976).
150. 354 F.2d at 614. Scenic Hudson's concern for these values was found adequate
to include it in the class of aggrieved parties for purposes of standing to sue under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 616.
151. For an account of how aesthetic values were presented at these hearings, see
Sive, supra note 21.
152. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
153. Id. at 467.
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to consider each of the environmental factors listed in section 101,
it held that this section did not give a court any greater right to
engage in substantive review.154 The court, in the view of the
dissent, rejected the position that a reviewing court ought to defer
to agency judgments only when they are based on the special ex-
pertise of the agency, and should provide extra guidance when
agencies consider aesthetics and other environmental values.'r The
court was satisfied to find that the modifications reflected "a
heightened awareness of the conflict between utilitarian and aes-
thetic needs."'"5 But the dissent would have adopted a more de-
manding standard of review and suggested that aesthetic considera-
tions tipped the scales in favor of reversal.15 7 Even though some
aesthetic improvements resulted from the FPC hearings, subse-
quent cases reveal that the standard of review adopted by the court
limits the promise of the Act.
If the Storm King litigation shows that very little can be
expected of the courts by way of substantive review, the litigation
of a Forest Service plan to permit logging in the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area (BWCA) of Minnesota shows how dangerous this
could be for environmental protection. Unless the courts are will-
ing actively to review agency decisions, they can justify almost any
decision within the vague contours of aesthetic variables.
The first phase of this litigation concerned the failure of the
Forest Service to file an environmental impact statement for its
''multiple use plan," permitting commercial timber cutting in
certain portal areas of the BWCA 58 This resulted in an order to
file an EIS. The plaintiffs then filed suit to challenge the adequacy
of the impact statement. 59
Six alternative plans were considered in the EIS. They ranged
from a proposal to prohibit logging throughout the BWCA, to one
permitting logging in any part of the area.16 0 The plan adopted
relied upon a distinction between portal and interior zones and
permitted timber harvest in the portal zone, except within 400 feet
154. Id. at 481.
155. Id. at 484 (Oakes, J., dissenting). See note 83 supra.
156. 453 F.2d at 481.
157. Id. at 491 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
158. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn.
1973), af'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
159. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 401 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Minn.
1975), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
160. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
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of the shorelines. 161 To justify this outcome, the Forest Service
evaluated each of the six alternative plans in terms of six "inherent
values," assigning a number from 1 to 3 to each value for each pro-
posal. The natural beauty of the shoreline was one of the "inherent
values" that entered into the score. 62 Three of the alternatives, in-
cluding the adopted plan, scored "3" on the shoreline beauty scale.
It "won" by one point: having held its own on the shoreline beauty
variable, it was able to pull ahead by getting high enough scores
for the values of "water travel network" and "research oppor-
tunity." Three other plans, including a prohibition on harvesting
virgin timber, scored "2" on the beauty scale and fell behind in
other areas. 63
In its review of the EIS, the district court concluded: "This
section reaches an arbitrary, unexplained and irrational conclu-
sion. The numerical values are arbitrarily assigned to the six values
under each alternative without explanation and the values them-
selves do not consider the value of virgin timber."'64 The court
illustrated this conclusion by considerations of the "water trans-
portation network" and "vegetation" variables, although its gen-
eral language extends to the "shoreline beauty" variable as well. 65
The court of appeals reversed, rejecting "this attempt to dis-
credit the scientific conclusions contained in the EIS."'' 66 It de-
clared that the conclusions were supported by data in the record
and ruled that when they were so supported, quantification was a
matter for experts, not courts. 67 Accordingly, the agency's con-
sideration of aesthetic values stood unquestioned even though the
protection of the environment was not its principal mandate.
The Boundary Waters Canoe Area cases provide only one
example of the effect of NEPA's failure to enact an objective, re-
viewable decision procedure. 68 Another is provided by Cape Henry
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1303 n.20. The others were water travel network, vegetation, wildlife,
recreation experience and research opportunity. Id.
163. Id. at 1304 n.21.
164. 401 F. Supp. at 1322.
165. Id. at 1321.
166. 541 F.2d at 1305.
167. Id., citing Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240
(W.D. Mo. 1973), a0'd sub nom. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Callaway, 497 F.2d
1340 (8th Cir. 1974).
168. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Stamm, 6 Emvm. R_'. (BNA) 1525 (E.D.
Cal. 1974), might be noted here. It involved the flooding of "scenic" canyons by the
Auburn Dam project in California. Although the court was not called upon to review the
decision substantively, id. at 1533, and limited its consideration to the question of whether
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Bird Club v. Laird,1' where the plaintiffs sought to have an agency
include environmental values in the cost-benefit analysis that sup-
plied the economic justification for the project. They alleged that
because the Corps of Engineers had failed to use an interdiscipli-
nary approach in its decision-making and had failed to quantify
environmental amenities, 170 it had not complied with substantive
and procedural mandates of NEPA when it approved the Gaith-
right Dam on the Jackson River in Virginia. They proposed the
quantification of amenities, in particular, the values of a free-
flowing stream and of the view of the tract as it stood, in an effort
to force the Corps to introduce these values into its cost-benefit
analysis. 17  The court ruled that the Corps had fulfilled NEPA's
requirements by reporting that it had not incorporated these values
into its cost-benefit analysis. 72 But the court did order the Corps
to further disclose the method it used to determine the costs and
benefits listed. Its response remains esssentially procedural and in
accord with the court's affirmation that it could not engage in sub-
stantive review; 7 8 no reconsideration of amenities resulted. 7 4
environmental values and project alternatives were adequately considered in the EIS, it
effectively engaged in sub rosa substantive review. It held that the Bureau of Reclamation
had not adequately considered either environmental values or project alternatives, finding,
for instance, that one alternative, a connector to another water system without the dam
was of "suffident importance" to have been included. Id. at 1531. To permit consideration
of such alternatives, the court enjoined further construction until an adequate impact
statement had been submitted. Id. at 1534. Aesthetic values were, at best, a motive in this
decision.
169. 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Ca.), aff'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973).
170. Id. at 409.
171. Id. at 414.
172. Id. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123
(5th Cir. 1974), which involved "ecological values" and came to an essentially similar view
of the demands of NEPA with regard to cost-benefit analysis: "We agree with the ultimate
thrust of the district court's legal and factual conclusion, which was that the Corps'
methodology satisfied subsection (B) by making a good faith attempt to weight and weigh
ecology in reaching its ultimate approval." Id. at 1133 (footnote omitted). For a considera-
tion of this matter, see Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts: Judicial Review Under
NEPA, 9 GA. L. REv. 417 (1975); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environ.
mental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REy. 1092 (1972).
For an example of the efforts to include environmental characteristics in economic
analysis, see N. COOMBER & A. BiswAs, EvALuATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTANGIBLES (1973).
For a consideration of the environmental dangers involved in efforts to reduce all envi-
ronmental characteristics to economic variables, see Ehrenfeld, The Conservation of Non-
Resources, 64 AMa. ScxE -rsr 648 (1976).
173. 359 F. Supp. at 410.
174. Id. at 414.
[Vol. 28
THE NEPA MODEL
CONCLUSION
If the degree of agency compliance with the substantive pro-
visions of NEPA depends upon the active intervention of the
courts,175 then the record of the courts to date suggests that there
has been little implementation of the substantive provisions of the
Act. NEPA was meant to affect the decision-making procedures of
the federal agencies by giving them a "secondary mandate." The
problem with the Act is that in subsequent review agencies are
presumed to have an expertise in aesthetic and other environmental
matters. The courts can revise agency judgments only according to
the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. It is likely that
the agencies can, by making their judgments within the categories
imposed by NEPA, render them invulnerable to court revision,
whatever their merit.
The "secondary mandate" of NEPA is not like the mandate
to regulate unfair competition. It is more analogous to the man-
date that the agencies satisfy the due process demands of the Con-
stitution, which is not the special concern of any particular agency.
When agency compliance with due process demands is in issue, we
recognize that agencies and agency decision-makers have vested
interests. Accordingly, we rely upon Congress and the courts to fill
out the contours of the concept. Perhaps environmental matters
are not treated in this manner because of a congressional determi-
nation that they are fundamentally different from matters of due
process. To admit a difference, however, is not to say that aesthetic
and other environmental concerns deserve no greater protection
than NEPA, as enforced by the courts, has provided.
Since NEPA leaves the protection of aesthetic values so radi-
cally to the agencies, a complete evaluation of the extent of their
protection requires an agency-by-agency review of the steps taken
to identify, and then preserve and enhance, these values. Among
the steps discovered might be: detailed agency guidelines, develop-
ment of devices to identify and evaluate aesthetic values, addition
of professional personnel to agency staffs and the provision for in-
dependent professional participation in the agency decision-making
process.
By 1973, few agencies had taken many such steps, even to a
175. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
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limited extent. A study commissioned by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency asserted that, as of that time, it was too soon to ex-
pect agency compliance with the directive of NEPA calling for the
protection of aesthetic values..7 6 The study did note, however, that
certain agencies-particularly the Department of Transportation,
the Forest Service, the National Park Service and the National En-
dowment for the Arts-had taken steps in the direction of full com-
pliance.7
If general legislative directives are to be relied upon to protect
aesthetic values, then independent expert judgment must be in-
sured within the agencies, and the courts must become more active
in reviewing agency decisions so that they can ensure agency com-
pliance. State legislatures could do more than merely adopt the
NEPA model, however. They could express more specific standards
to guide the agencies and to direct the courts. In addition, they
could take greater note of the observation of the court in Maryland-
National: a legislature that develops zoning regulations under the
police power can act with much less justification than is required
of a plaintiff who seeks to overcome a prior agency decision. 170
Zoning, as a "management tool," permits the development of a
comprehensive plan that provides for the protection of whatever
it is that the legislature intends to protect.18 This "tool" ought to
be re-evaluated by the states now implementing the Coastal Zone
Management Act.'
JAMES R. PIGGUSH
176. M. BAGLEY, C. KROLL & K. CLARK, AE.STHECS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 107
(Environmental Protection Agency, Off. of Research and Dev.) (1978).
177. Id. at 108-32.
178. See note 29 supra.
179. 487 F.2d at 1036-58.
180. Examples of regional plans include the New York Adirondacks Plan, N.Y. Exec.
LAw §§ 800-819 (McKinney Supp. 1979), which relied upon ground zoning together with
very specific directives to an administrative agency. See Booth, Developing Institutions for
Regional Land Use Planning and Control-The Adirondack Experience, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 677 (1979); Savage & Sierchio, The Adirondack Park Agency Act: A Regional Land
Use Plan Confronts "The Taking Issue," 40 Ara. L. REV. 447 (1976); Note, Preserving
Scenic Areas: The Adirondack Land Use Program, 84 YALE L.J. 1705 (1975).
181. See notes 2 & 3 supra. See also Comment, The Legal History of Zoning for
Aesthetic Purposes, 8 IND. L.J. 1028 (1975). But see Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal
Implementation of Coastal Zone Management: The North Carolina Model, 1976 DuKa
L.J. 1; 5 COUNCIL ON ENVr'L QuALrY AN. REP. 55-59 (1974).
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